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Introduction
Now that the 20th century has passed
into the domain of history books, we can
retrospectively begin to assess the relative
contributions that the many advances in
the realm of infectious disease have
actually made to public health in general.
At the top of this virtuous list will surely be
the discovery of antibiotics in the 1930s
and the use of vaccination to eradicate
smallpox as an extant human disease in
the 1960s and 1970s. As clearly pointed
out in a recent book by D. A. Henderson,
one of the leaders of the global smallpox
eradication program, this task of ridding
Homo sapiens from the curse of this
ancestral disease was neither easy nor
without controversy [1]. In fact, the
history of the many consequences of
smallpox on humankind reads like a long
litany of human misery and calamitous
events, but is juxtaposed with the more
noble accomplishments that began with
the discovery of vaccination by Jenner in
1798 and culminated with the World
Health Organization (WHO) certifying
the world free of smallpox in 1980 [2].
With this singular accomplishment, as
many as 60–100 million individuals who
would have been predicted to die of
smallpox have been spared from a truly
gruesome death. Nevertheless, as is inti-
mated by the timeline in Table 1, which
summarizes the history of smallpox and
the orthopoxvirus that caused the disease
(variola virus), the narrative of smallpox
did not stop with its eradication as a
pandemic human disease. Instead, we find
ourselves still wrestling with an issue that
intermingles public health policy, philoso-
phy, national security, and bioterrorism,
and affects our perceptions of research
ethics with extreme pathogens in general.
It boils down to a not-so-simple question:
What exactly should the Victor do with
the Vanquished?
In 1980, this question seemed simpler
than now. Following the smallpox eradi-
cation, all declared stocks of the live
variola virus were rounded up and distilled
into two WHO-approved repositories,
now residing at the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC), Atlanta, United States of
America, and at Vector, Novosobirsk,
Russia. WHO convened a standing com-
mittee to oversee these repositories and
issue regulatory approval for any research
studies that utilized the live virus stocks at
the two sites, with the tacit assumption
that the only justifiable long-term fate for
these stocks was an autoclave. Then, the
revelation that variola virus had been
covertly weaponized and stockpiled by
the Soviet military [3,4] led to escalating
waves of mistrust and suspicion amongst
politicians, government officials, scientists,
and health policy experts alike [5]. Fac-
tions then formed, with the two sides
collectively promulgating an agenda that
was either pro-destruction or anti-destruc-
tion, and cogent arguments were made by
members of both camps as to why the
declared stocks of variola virus should be
maintained or not [6–8]. In the meantime,
the member states holding the declared
stocks of live virus (i.e., the US and Russia)
held their own internal deliberations of
what to do next, in a kind of pas de trois
with the WHO that continues to this day.
In the case of the US, input was sought
from the Institute of Medicine (IOM),
which has struck two expert committees
(the first issued its report in 1999, and the
second committee report was released
in July 2009 at http://www.iom.edu/
Reports/2009/LiveVariolaVirusContinuing
Research.aspx; [9]) on the scientific ratio-
nale for any further research that would
require live variola virus. It is expected
that these two IOM reports will be
factored into the US decision as to how
to respond to any future request from
WHO (expected in 2011), following a vote
of member states of the World Health
Assembly on the specific issue of whether
the declared live variola virus stocks held
at both sites should now finally be
destroyed.
But Science Continues to March
On
In the meantime, particularly in the past
decade, some genuinely intriguing science
has been conducted with variola virus
and closely related pathogenic orthopox-
viruses. Many diverse scientific fields that
impinge directly on the issue of variola
virus research potential (e.g., genomics,
proteomics, virus–host interactomics, bio-
informatics, synthetic biology, etc.) have
been moving forward at breakneck speed,
and so has the technical ability to query
related issues like viral pathogenesis and
host tropism. The nearly complete geno-
mic sequences of two variola isolates were
first published in the early 1990s, but now
that almost 50 distinct genome sequences
are available on the Web (http://www.
poxvirus.org), derived from independent
isolates collected throughout the world at
various times in the 20th century, new
clues as to the origin, spread, and
evolution of variola clades within the
human population have been deduced
[10,11]. We now know that variola virus
is most closely related genetically to two
tightly host-restricted orthopoxviruses, the
camel-specific camelpox and the gerbil
pathogen taterapox, neither of which
infect humans. In contrast, the one
orthopoxvirus that can cause a clinical
disease in humans that most closely
resembles smallpox is spread to humans
by zoonotic infection with an African
rodent virus called monkeypox virus.
However, monkeypox is genetically much
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likely represents a distinct lineage of
orthopoxviruses.
Although variola virus does not infect
nonhuman primates, some aspects of late-
stage smallpox disease can be modeled in
macaques, provided the virus is adminis-
tered intravenously at high doses [12]. In
microarray studies with such variola virus-
infected macaques, it has been shown that
this virus has learned how to turn off the
host systemic inflammatory responses that
are under the control of tumor necrosis
factor (TNF) and nuclear factor kappa B
(NFkB) in vivo [13]. However, it is
important to appreciate the important
caveat that variola virus in nature is
restricted to only human hosts, and no
surrogate nonhuman primate accurately
models smallpox disease, either in terms of
infectious doses required to initiate infec-
tion or in disease progression. In fact, this
limitation means that animal models may
never be able to completely mimic small-
pox disease in humans.
In the past decade, various proteomic
strategies in vitro have revealed that the
variola genome encodes many potent
inhibitors of various human immune
response cascades, including targets such
as serum complement, IL-18, interferon-
gamma, TNF, chemokines, and various
signaling cascades [14–16]. Most recently,
systematic yeast 2-hybrid screening of the
unique variola proteins against the entire
human proteome has uncovered even
more viral modulators of human immune
signaling, including a new poxviral inhib-
itor family that targets a precursor NFkB1
protein [17]. In fact, there is every reason
to suspect that many more secrets about
human ‘‘anti-immunology’’ remain unde-
ciphered and undiscovered within the
variola genome. What remains conten-
tious is whether live variola virus will ever
be required in order to unravel these
secrets. We simply cannot predict whether
future development of more ‘‘humanized’’
small animal models might progress to
the point where smallpox could be more
accurately modeled outside of human
hosts.
In addition, biodefense-driven research
efforts that were sparked by fears of the
potential re-emergence of smallpox have
also generated new classes of potent anti-
poxviral drugs, such as ST-246 and the
lipid-soluble cidofovir derivative CMX001,
and newer generations of vaccines that are
more compliant with regulations of the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (e.g.,
ACAMBIS 2000) or safer for immuno-
compromised individuals (e.g., MVA or
LC16m8) have been developed and stock-
piled. These drugs and vaccines have the
dual benefit that they are likely also
efficacious for other related zoonotic ortho-
poxvirus infections of humans, particularly
monkeypox and cowpox viruses. Addition-
ally, the new anti-poxviral drugs have been
used to treat rare cases of runaway
infections with the live vaccinia vaccine
itself. Newer diagnostics based on PCR
techniques or directed sequencing have
refined the ability to distinguish bona fide
variola infections from those caused by
closely related orthopoxviruses. In fact,
these advances can be counted among the
genuine success stories made possible by
the increased biodefense funding in the US
since the terrorism events of 2001.
But despite these advances, there is far
more that we simply do not understand
about smallpox disease or its causative
virus. The smallpox vaccine, vaccinia
virus, remains the poster-child for human
vaccines, but we have only begun to
understand how vaccinia-induced immune
responses protect vaccinees from ortho-
poxvirus infections [18,19]. We do know
that both memory B cell and T cell
immune responses combine to provide
the disease protection conferred by the live
vaccine. Specific combinations of vaccinia
proteins within subunit vaccines have also
been shown to be capable of inducing
protective immunity via specific antibodies
or T cell responses in animal models of
orthopoxvirus disease. In contrast, we still
do not understand why smallpox disease
was so lethal in humans, or if host
responses such as the oft-quoted and still
poorly-understood ‘‘cytokine storm’’ is
really a key instrument of the disease
pathophysiology. In fact, we do not
comprehend the basis for the strict host
tropism of variola virus for humans, nor
why there are no animal reservoirs. So,
there is really no scientific debate about
whether variola virus still has much to
teach us about human immunology and
viral pathogenesis in general. Instead, the
main flashpoint for debate remains the
issue of risk versus benefit at acquiring any
more scientific information with live
variola virus. More recently, however,
another confounding element has entered
this debate that may soon render the issue
of retention versus destruction moot.
Specifically, can we actually ever truly
get rid of this virus?
Vanquished Perhaps, but
Defeated?
In the 1980s, the debate focused on
whether the destruction of the declared
variola stocks would actually free the
Table 1. History of Smallpox: Timeline of a Serial Killer.
.2000 B.C. Smallpox appears in humans in Africa and the Far East
1157 B.C. Pharaoh Ramses V dies of smallpox
910 A.D. Clinical disease first described (by Rhazes)
1096–1291 Crusaders accelerate smallpox importation to Europe
1507–1530 Aztec, Mayan, and Inca empires decimated by smallpox
1400–1800 European fatalities alone exceed 500 million/century
1763 First intentional use as a bioweapon (against Native Americans)
1798 Vaccination introduced by Jenner
1965 WHO initiates intensified worldwide eradication program
1977 Last natural case of smallpox (in Somalia)
1978 Last case of smallpox in humans (lab accident in the UK)
1980 WHO certifies worldwide eradication of smallpox
1983 All known variola stocks transfered to the two certified WHO collaborating centers (US and
Russia)
1993 Variola DNA genome sequence published
1996 World Health Assembly (WHA) recommends variola destruction (in 1999)
1999 WHA recommends postponing destruction to permit further research with live variola virus
1999 First IOM report on research needs for live variola virus
1999 Biohazard published (K. Alibeck)
2001 US announces postponement of variola destruction
2009 Second IOM Report on research needs for live variola virus
2011 WHA vote on destruction of the declared live variola virus stocks (expected)
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1000727.t001
PLoS Pathogens | www.plospathogens.org 2 January 2010 | Volume 6 | Issue 1 | e1000727planet forever from the specter of smallpox
re-emergence, or whether destruction
would simply make the world a more
dangerous place where suspected covert
stocks of virus would assume greater
danger as potential bioweapons or agents
of bioterrorism. Even now in the first
decade of the 21st century, we still do not
know if any live variola virus stocks exist
outside of the two WHO-approved repos-
itories, but the combination of an exten-
sive public literature on variola virus
genomic sequences coupled with the
rapidly advancing technologies of DNA
gene synthesis and synthetic biology have
now made the possibility of creating live
variola virus (and indeed any viral patho-
gen) from scratch readily achievable.
Although variola virus remains the first
and only human pathogen to sit in the
gallows, waiting potential execution, it
will not be the last. Polio stands a
reasonable chance of being eradicated
as a human disease in our lifetime (and
Rinderpest as a cattle disease), but as
Wimmer’s lab showed in 2002, any
scientist with access to a gene synthesizer
can now construct live polio virus using
relatively standard laboratory reagents
[20]. Nobody has yet published the
complete construction of a live poxvirus
from fully synthetic genes, but the tech-
nologies needed for resuscitating live
poxviruses from plasmids, PCR ampli-
cons, or bacmid fragments are now well-
established [21–23]. In fact, the only two
remaining ingredients now needed to
create a live poxvirus from elemental
chemicals are motivation and money.
This bedeviling issue of how synthetic
biology can be applied to human patho-
gens has not escaped attention by scien-
tists and policymakers alike, and the
debate becomes only more problematic
as the technologies for synthetic biology
increase in robustness and decrease in
cost [24,25].
What to Do?
Given the above conundrum, the obvi-
ous question is whether the destruction of
the declared live variola virus stocks would
be a genuine victory for humankind or
merely be a symbolic gesture that provides
only an illusion of security. Should the
message to the scientific community of the
future be that no further scientific queries
will be tolerated that require live variola
virus? Presently, the WHO-mandated
restrictions on labs working even with
noninfectious plasmid DNAs containing
variola gene sequences are very stringent
[26], but advancing genomic and proteo-
mic technologies remain far ahead of legal
restrictions. For example, it is still unde-
fined what constitutes a ‘‘legal’’ variola
gene sequence. Some orthopoxviruses, like
vaccinia virus, encode many genes that are
essentially identical to variola virus, or that
can be easily mutated into genes that
express the orthologous variola protein
exactly. Furthermore, synthetic genes,
particularly those that are codon-opti-
mized, can be created that are very
different in terms of nucleotide sequence
from the native variola genome sequence,
but can be translated into accurate variola
proteins. Indeed, if a synthetic poxvirus
were created that possessed only codon-
optimized genes for maximal efficiency in
human cells, we simply do not know if it
would be pathogenic in vivo or whether it
would be transmutated into a less virulent
version of its parent. Presently, any
experiment involving the genetic manipu-
lation of variola virus, including even the
cassetting of individual variola genes
into another poxvirus, is strictly forbi-
dden (WHO policies can be found at
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/smallpox/
research/en/index.html).
Similar ethical issues remain when we
consider the likelihood of whether a new
recombinant orthopoxvirus, derived from
poxviruses that alone are nonpathogenic
to humans, might be capable of causing
smallpox-like disease in humans. It is
already known that zoonotic infections
with monkeypox virus resemble clinical
smallpox closely, but these infections are
only poorly transmissible from human to
human [27,28]. It is still impossible to
predict the biologic or pathogenic proper-
ties of novel poxviruses created when
closely related poxviruses recombine with
each other, which can and does occur
either in the wild or in a laboratory.
Figure 1. Smallpox is a uniquely human disease. This 1974 photo of a young villager in the
Rangpur district of northeastern Bangladesh depicts one of the last known infections of a human
with variola major virus. (Source: Jean Roy, Emory Global Health Institute, from the CDC Public
Health Image Library at http://phil.cdc.gov/phil/home.asp.)
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1000727.g001
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remains contentious is that variola virus
has killed more human beings in the
civilized era than any other known
pathogen. Even though the disease itself
has not been seen for over 30 years,
pictures of its victims still have the power
to remind us of why this viral pathogen is
still feared (Figure 1). No civilized person
wants to see another smallpox case again
in humans [29], but exactly what is the
surest route to that end?
The debate about the potential destruc-
tion of variola virus, for better or worse, is
returning to the front page. Now, howev-
er, the emergence of open access publish-
ing and open source technology allows for
more input and dialogue from a wider
spectrum of people who may wish their
views to be registered. The member states
of the World Health Assembly will soon be
polled for their vote on whether the
existing declared stocks of variola virus
should be destroyed or not. So, until then,
the readers of PLoS Pathogens are invited
to comment on this issue online via the
Comments tab, which is located under-
neath the article title (commenting re-
quires a PLoS Journals account; read
more at http://www.plospathogens.org/
static/help.action#account).
The debate may also prove to be
instructive when the next human micro-
bial pathogen lands on death row, await-
ing our collective verdict.
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